United State Supreme Court Revisits 6th Amendment Right To Confront Witnesses. There Will Be State Consequences.
Over the past 10 years the Supreme Court has been interpreting the meaning of confronting a witness. The most recent published analyses was the case of New Mexico v. Bullcoming. That case was specifically a DUI case and the absence of a witness who actually analyzed the blood of the defendant. While this case has had some impact on how the State presents witnesses and subsequent evidence, Judges have not been able to apply the concepts for fear of not knowing where to draw the line at confrontation. In fact the biggest complaint from the Washington Judiciary has been the lack of guidance.
Further clarification is now, again, on its way with Williams v. Illinois. This case was accepted by the USSC for review of People v. Williams, 939 N.E.2d 268 (Ill. 2010). Oral arguments to the USSC were heard on December 6. The ruling is under consideration. The case presents a review of the presentation of expert evidence where the Illinois Supreme Court held: the absent analyst’s report was introduced not for the truth of what it asserted but rather “to show the underlying facts and data [the in-court witness] used before rendering an expert opinion in this case.” In simple English the lab report in a DNA case was not admitted, but examined by an expert in the related field to examine the report and then to render an opinion, but the actual analyst who tested the substance and created the report was not present.
Traditionally an expert can rely on reports of others to render an opinion, but in this case the opinion was sought to avoid the cross examination of the person who prepared the report and did the testing. The case has the potential to impact expert testimony in criminal cases beyond expert forensic testimony. As a result of the nature of this issue, the question to be answered in light of the right to confront witnesses, is now how much an expert may rely on statements and facts of others who do not testify at trial? Under Federal and State Court Rule 703, traditionally an expert may rely upon “facts or data” in which an expert “in the particular field would reasonably rely,” and the facts and data “need not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted.” The question in the case is whether the Confrontation Clause allows this practice and to what extent.
As always is the case with the Court, the impact of the ruling is a concern and this case is no different given the following statement of Justice Stephen G. Breyer:
requiring multiple forensic technicians to testify would result in “a sea change in normal criminal law practices.
He then suggested that an exception to testimonial statements be considered for expert testimony. Such an exception is unprecedented to date. Questions like this from the Justices during Oral Arguments makes one wonder if the case signals another new direction or solidification of the Confrontation Clause and caselaw to date. Currently, the USSC has gone to great lengths to require that when the government presents testimonial statements from witnesses, experts or laypersons, the person making the statement must be subject to cross-examination. Given the use of rule 702, will this Court now relax the bright line recently established and make an accommodation for expert testimony?
The traditional voting lines of the Justices on the recent confrontation cases have been by five to four margins. The make-up of the Court currently is important for the “swing-vote.” The local Judiciary here in Whatcom County, Washington State are paying attention as this new rule will have an impact.
Recently I had the opportunity to test the local courts understanding and use of the Bullcoming decision, and the results were not consistent with the case law to date. In a local DUI case the State sought to use a surrogate breath test technician to rely on records to show that the breath test machine was in proper working order at the time of my client’s case. The surrogate Technician had no knowledge of what was actually done to or with the breath test machine at the time of my clients test as he was not even a technician on the date she was arrested and providing a breath sample. The following argument was made:
Beginning in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, (2004), our U.S. Supreme court held that the Confrontation Clause could be abrogated “…only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.”
In 2007 our state Supreme Court stated that “until the Supreme Court more fully develops precisely what is “testimonial” under the confrontation clause, all courts will be divining the intent of our nation’s highest court.” State v. Mason. Fortunately, 2 years later, the U.S. Supreme Court did just that in their subsequent decision of Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue of confrontation vis-à-vis the chemical testing of drugs being introduced at trial.
The Melendez-Diaz, Court, declined to create a “forensic evidence exception” to Crawford, when they held that “a forensic laboratory report, created specifically to serve as evidence in a criminal proceeding, ranked as “testimonial for Confrontation Clause purposes.” Subsequent to Melendez-Diaz, what can only be considered the most comprehensive analyses and enforcement of a Defendant’s 6th Amendment, and fortunately for this case, analyzed and presented vis-à-vis a DUI trial, is Bullcoming v. New Mexico. In Bullcoming the Court reversed the trial court because blood evidence in a DUI trial was admitted over the Defendant’s objection when the State failed to call the individual who actually analyzed the blood sample. The principal evidence against Bullcoming was a forensic lab report reporting and certifying that Bullcoming’s blood alcohol level was well above the threshold for an aggravated DWI. In lieu of testimony from the analyst who actually did the testing, that State sought to admit the analyst’s report and the results thereof through another analyst who had not tested nor signed the certification. In short the “surrogate” analyst had no personal knowledge as to the actual testing, but was familiar and proficient with respect to the State’s laboratory’s testing procedures. At trial this “surrogate” reviewed the notes made by the actual analyst and testified to the results printed upon the paper.
The State circumvented the Defendant’s 6th Amendment right as proffering this certificate as a business record, and then elicits testimony from this other analyst. The trial Court and the New Mexico Supreme Court were correct in holding that “the blood-alcohol analysis was indeed ‘testimonial,’ but were incorrect in their holding that the “Confrontation Clause did not require the certifying analyst’s in-court testimony because live testimony of another analyst satisfied the constitutional requirements.” As a result, the Bullcoming Court has now provided every subordinate court the guidance they had been seeking since Crawford.
Most importantly is the sum total of the Bullcoming holding: the Clause (confrontation) does not tolerate dispensing with confrontation simply because the court believes that questioning one witness about another’s testimonial statements provides a fair enough opportunity for cross-examination. Furthermore, the purpose of the rights set forth in [the Sixth] Amendment is to ensure a fair trial; but it does not follow that the rights can be disregarded so long as the trial is, on the whole, fair.”
Short and simple is the fact that when the state elects to introduce any testimonial certification, the author of that becomes a witness, and as held in Bullcoming, the defendant has an absolute right to confront. The plea of our State Supreme Court in Mason, for guidance, was answered pre-Bullcoming in Melendez-Diaz, where the Bullcoming Court cites to:
The “certificates of analysis” prepared by the analysts who tested the evidence in Melendez-Diaz, this Court held, were “incontrovertibly . . . affirmation[s] made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact” in a criminal proceeding. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 4) (internal quotation marks omitted). The same purpose was served by the certificate in question here. A document created solely for an “evidentiary purpose,” Melendez-Diaz clarified, made in aid of a police investigation, ranks as testimonial. 557 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 5) (forensic reports available for use at trial are “testimonial statements” and certifying analyst is a “‘witness’ for purposes of the Sixth Amendment”).
Finally, the Bullcoming Court left us with a clear indication of what is testimony as well as clearly set forth the State’s obligation:
The prosecution, however, bears the burden of proof. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 19) (“[T]he Confrontation Clause imposes a burden on the prosecution to present its witnesses, not on the defendant to bring those adverse witnesses into court.”). Hence the obligation to propel retesting when the original analyst is unavailable is the State’s, not the defendant’s. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U. S. 400, 410, n. 14 (1988) (Confrontation Clause’s requirements apply “in every case, whether or not the defendant seeks to rebut the case against him or to present a case of his own”).
Recently, the Washington Appellant Courts have held steadfast to Bullcoming notably in the matter of State v. Dash, — P.3d —-, 2011 WL 3433019 (Wash.App. Div. 1)(2011). In Dash, the conviction was reversed on the instructional error, and the Confrontation issue became moot for the appeal “however, because some of these issues may arise on remand, we briefly address these remaining claims of error in order to assist the trial court.” The Dash, trial court improperly, and in violation of the Dash’s 6th Amendment right, admitted a videotaped interview of witness Taylor, who was not subjected to cross-examination neither during the interview nor at trial. As a result Dash asserts that his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him was violated. In providing guidance to the lower court(s) due to remand, the Appellant Court held that the proper focus is not on whether the statement is hearsay but, rather, whether the statement is offered “against” the defendant to establish or prove a past event relevant to the criminal prosecution.
Furthermore, the Appellant Court specifically quoted Melendez-Diaz and held that the text of the Amendment (6th) contemplates two classes of witnesses—those against the defendant and those in his favor. The prosecution must produce the former; the defendant may call the latter. Contrary to respondent’s assertion, there is not a third category of witnesses, helpful to the prosecution, but somehow immune from confrontation. Here, (in Dash’s trial) several of Taylor’s utterances, whether directly accusatory or not, were being offered by the State to “prove one fact necessary for his conviction” and as established by the United States Supreme Court, “a witness need not directly accuse the defendant of wrong doing in order to be a witness subject to cross-examination for purposes of confrontation clause.”
In the DUI case i tried here locally, Defendant faced a charge of DUI, in which the State sought to (and were permitted in the end) convict under RCW 46.61.506 (a breath test printout). As a result, a significant piece evidence against Defendant is generated by a machine, yet requires an offering of statement “against” the defendant to in order to establish or prove a past event relevant to the criminal prosecution.
The State has indicated that they will be calling the arresting officer as a witness, a DataMaster Technician who, at the time of the test in this case, was not trained, nor employed as a Breath Test Technician and therefore, has no personal knowledge of the operating condition of the breath test machine at the time of the breath test being offered here. Furthermore, the State 2 days prior to trial has endorsed 3 Toxicologists that did not create the external simulator solution.
Given the 6th Amendment, the creator of the solution is a necessary witnesses, as are those who “certified” either the external simulator solution, or the individual(s) who prepared, tested and certified any of the four simulator solutions used in the mandatory Quality Assurance Procedure (QAP) for the machine used to test Defendant’s breath.
Finally, the State has endorsed a sworn testimonial statement by the State Toxicologist, Fiona Couper. This statement is testimonial and clearly falls under the confrontational case law of Crawford, Melendez-Diaz, and Bullcoming.
The Defendant objects to any use of the sworn statement on 6th Amendment grounds as well as a violation of CrRLJ 6.13.
Defendant further objects to the document since it is a declaration subsequent to the date in question and has no relevance to the breath test in this case. See Ludvigsen v. City of Seattle, 162 Wash.2d 660, 174 P.3d 43(2007)(We conclude the application of the 2004 DWI amendments, redefining a “valid” test, to Ludvigsen’s 2002 criminal conduct violates the ex post facto clause. The 2002 definition governs).
Consider the well-settled law on a breath test. For a Breath test to be admissible in Washington, it must first be valid. State v. Baker, 56 Wn.2d 846 (1960); State v. Straka, 116 Wn.2d 859, at 870 (1991); State v. Watson, 51 Wn.App. 947 (1988); State v. Brayman, 110 Wn. 2d 183, 191, 751 P.2d 294 (1988). The admissibility of breath tests is governed by RCW 46.61.506, and WAC 448-16 et seq and RCW 46.61.506 (3). RCW 46.61.506 (3) states that:
Analysis of the person’s blood or breath to be considered valid under the provisions of this section or RCW 46.61.502 or 46.61.504 shall have been performed according to methods approved by the state toxicologist and by an individual possessing a valid permit issued by the state toxicologist for this purpose. The state toxicologist is directed to approve satisfactory techniques or methods, to supervise the examination of individuals to ascertain their qualifications and competence to conduct such analyses, and to issue permits which shall be subject to termination or revocation at the discretion of the state toxicologist. (Emphasis added).
Additionally, WAC 448-16-070, reads:
The state toxicologist will review, approve, and authorize such protocols of procedures and methods (of the toxicologist’s own promulgation or submitted by outside agencies or individuals for consideration) required in the administration of the breath test program. These protocols will be updated as necessary to maintain the quality of the breath test program. (Emphasis Added).
Ignoring the issue of whether RCW 46.61.506(3) and WAC 448-16-070 require a preliminary finding of validity by the trier of fact, at a minimum, taken together RCW 46.61.506(3) and WAC 448-16-070 mandate that the State demonstrate, at trial, compliance with the methods, techniques, and protocols established by the State toxicologist in order to establish that a given result is VALID. One such procedure in place, deemed “necessary to maintain the quality of the breath test program,” is the use of “certified” simulator solutions which are to be used in a mandatory annual QAP and in the external standard during a breath test.
The protocol for the Quality Assurance Procedure was written and approved by the State Toxicologist, pursuant to her authority under RCW 46.61.506 and WAC 448-16-070, on December 10, 2010. While describing the QAP procedure in the 2010 WSP Calibration Technical Manual, Dr. Couper states that
The Quality Assurance Procedure (QAP) ensures the accuracy, precision and forensic acceptability of the DataMaster breath test instrument for the purpose of quantitative evidential measurement of the alcohol concentration of a person’s breath. The procedure evaluates critical systems within the instrument to ensure their compliance with strict predetermined criteria. When complying with the standards required in the QAP, the DataMaster can be confidently placed in the field for evidential use. (Emphasis Added).
One of the “standards required in the QAP” is what is referred to as a CALIBRATION PROCEDURE which consists of calibrating the machine with a 0.08 QAP solution. The protocol requires that this QAP solution be “certified” among other technical requirements related to the calibration of the machine.
Another one of the “standards required in the QAP” is referred to as a CERTIFICATION PROCEDURE. This protocol also requires the use of “certified solutions” wherein the machine tests certified simulator solutions at 0.04, 0.08, 0.10, and 0.15. There are likewise additional technical requirements that must be followed relating to this process.
While a BAC Technician is typically the one to perform a QAP, only those analysts who are employed, trained, and certified by the State Toxicologist may prepare and certify the simulator solutions (including those that are required for a QAP). However, before the solution can be certified it MUST exist, it must have been created by someone and the creation of the solution is found in Chapter 3 of the 2010 WSP Calibration Technical Manual, and is entitled PREPARATION OF THE EXTERNAL STANDARD SOLUTION. This section describes the procedures that must be followed in order to prepare and certify an external standard solution.
Dr. Couper has approved a protocol for both creation and certification of the solution. This protocol, for this particular solution created in 2010 (in fact it is the 24th solution created). The creator is to follow specific steps in making the solution and then “once mixing is complete, purge the spigot then remove an aliquot of the solution for certification (refer to 4.0 Certification of Simulator Solutions).”
This protocol for certification is found in Section 4, and is referred to as CERTIFICATION OF SIMULATOR SOLUTIONS. It states at the end of the creation that:
Each external standard and QAP solution must be certified by forensic scientists prior to its distribution to breath test technicians. The forensic scientists must have a valid Blood Alcohol Analyst Permit issued by the State Toxicologist. A minimum of three (3) analysts shall test each solution before the average solution concentration can be calculated. Typically, three (3) analysts certify each set of QAP solutions, and seven to eight (7-8) analysts certify the external standard solution. Each analyst who has results included in the final computation of the average solution concentration has certified the batch. (Emphasis Added).
Just as certified solutions are required for any QAP, so too are certified solutions required for use an “external standard.” The external standard test is perhaps the most important function of the Datamaster and Datamaster CDM, as it provides the contemporaneous testing of a known and predetermined quantity of alcohol at the time of a subject’s breath test.
The specific protocol approved by the RCW 46.61.506 (4)(a)(iv) requires evidence that “Prior to the start of the test, the temperature of any liquid simulator solution utilized as an external standard, as measured by a thermometer approved of by the state toxicologist was thirty-four degrees centigrade plus or minus 0.3 degrees centigrade. According to WAC 448-16-030(8) and (11):
(8) ‘External Standard Test” means the process by which the accuracy of the instrument is verified, using a simulator containing a certified simulator solution or a compressed gas standard containing a known alcohol concentration. (11) ‘Simulator‘ means a device which when filled with a certified simulator solution, maintained at a known temperature, provides a vapor sample of known alcohol concentration.
Therefore the plain meaning of the statute requires a showing, by testimony that the solution was certified. Certification is a process and has been established by the State Toxicologist. As stated throughout this text, the procedure is found in Chapter 3, and chapter 4 of the Washington State Patrol Toxicology Laboratory Division technical manual - Breath Alcohol Calibration, chapters 3 – Preparation of the External Standard Solution AND Chapter 4 – Certification Of Simulator Solutions. Section 6, entitled, EXTERNAL STANDARD SOLUTION CHANGING PROCEDURE, mandates that that “[o]nly certified external standard solutions are to be used” and that these must be changed every 60 days. (Emphasis added).
Given the above referenced protocols, Statutes, and WAC provisions, it is clear that if the State is to establish that a breath test is valid under RCW 46.61.506(3), and admissible under RCW 46.61.506, they must first elicit testimony from witnesses that can attest to personally doing the things necessary to demonstrate the various preconditions necessary to admit the test.
As stated above, every step of the process involves the offering of statement(s) “against” the defendant to in order to establish or prove a past event relevant to the criminal prosecution. Absent productions of witness with personal knowledge an attempt to prove compliance with RCW 46.61.506, by either producing documentation of testimonial declaration or certifications, the Defendant’s 6th Amendment right properly demanded under CrRLJ 6.13 (See Defendant’s NOA and DEMAND Number 36, 37, 39) and therefore NOT waived.
Consequently, this Court must adopt the rulings of our U.S. Supreme Court in Crawford v. Washington, in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, and the recent opinion of Bullcoming v. New Mexico, as well as the Washington case law subsequent thereto.
Despite all this law, the Court held that the only right to confront held by my client was to cross examine the arresting officer! This ruling ignored the USSC and all State Court authority above the trial court, and was also was a result of RCW 46.61.506(4) which ignores subsection (3) of the same requiring the machine to be found in proper working order such that it produces a valid test. With this type of ruling despite the case law to date, every citizen accused of DUI, and their lawyers need to be watching for the ruling to be issue in Williams.
Jonathan Rands is an experienced, dedicated, and tenacious DUI lawyer with proven DUI defense success. Confronting all witness and exposing the limitations of their proffered evidence is an important right that effects each and every DUI case where there is a breath or blood test measuring alcohol concentration, or simply based on officer observations. If you or someone you know is facing a DUI or alcohol related arrest, contact Jonathan Rands. | http://www.jrandslaw.com | Email: jrands@jonathanrands.com | Phn. 360.306.8136 | Jonathan Rands is Focused On Your DUI Defense. | Serving Whatcom, Skagit, Island, and San Juan Counties. | Jonathan Rands regularly discusses DUI issues with (AM 790 ) KGMI every other Sunday on the Legal Docket.
DUI Conviction Mandatory Breath Test Fee Increased To 200.00. Ever Wonder Where The Money Goes?
Until recently, the fine for a person who is convicted of a DUI, or crime reduced from DUI were all required to pay 125.00; traditionally this is called the “Breath Test” Fee. This fee is assessed regardless of whether a person actually provided a sample, or refused the test as they are statutorily permitted to do. Upon conviction, when fees and fines for the crime, regardless of whether it was reduced, were all totaled it came to $866.00 for a first offense under .15 breath sample, and $1121.00 for a first offense over .15 breath sample or a test refusal. Probation fees are not set by statute and are charged monthly depending on the level of supervision and agency policy.
As of July 22, 2011, the fines and fee for the conviction have increased as a result of the breath test fee increasing. The 125.00 breath test fee has been increased by $75.00 per test. As a result of this increase the former totals of $866.00 and $1121.00 are now $941.00 and $1196.00. Traditionally, this fee is not able to be waived, but as an added change, under special circumstances and upon a verified petition by the person assessed the fee, the court may suspend payment of all or part of the fee if it finds that the person does not have the ability to pay.
So the fee is increased, but have you ever wondered what happens to these DUI fines and fees? According to the statute, this breath test fee is for the purpose of funding the Washington State Toxicology Laboratory and the Washington State Patrol grants and activities to increase the conviction rate and decrease the incidence of persons driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. The logic of this will be discussed shortly, but here is the breakdown of this fee use.
According to the statute, the fee assessed shall be collected by the clerk of the court and, subject to another statute (RCW 46. 61. 5054 [4]), $175.00 of the breath test fee MUST be distributed as follows:
Forty percent ($70.00) shall be subject to distribution under the authority of following statutes: RCW 3.46.120 (Repealed), RCW 3.50.100 (where to deposit and interest earned), RCW 35.20.220 (Powers and Duties of Chief Court Clerk), RCW 3.62.020 (Forfeiture Money From District Courts), RCW 3.62.040 (Forfeiture Money From City Cases), or RCW 10.82.070 (Superior Court Collections).
The remainder of the fee ($105.00) shall be forwarded to the state treasurer who shall, deposit: Fifteen percent ($15.75) in the death investigations’ account to be used solely for funding the state toxicology laboratory blood or breath testing programs; and eighty-five percent ($89.25) in the state patrol highway account to be used solely for funding activities to increase the conviction rate and decrease the incidence of persons driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs.
The remaining 25.00 from the original 200.00 ($175.00 MUST be used as described above), or the extra 25.00 that takes the prior 175.00 fee to 200.00 must be distributed to the highway safety account to be used solely for funding Washington traffic safety commission grants to reduce statewide collisions caused by persons driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Grants awarded under this subsection may be for projects that encourage collaboration with other community, governmental, and private organizations, and that utilize innovative approaches based on best practices or proven strategies supported by research or rigorous evaluation.
After reading the statue closely, it now begs the question of: what are these innovative approaches to reduce “crashes?” Keep in mind the statute by their very plain language do not seek to reduce the incidences of drunk driving, rather they seek to reduce crashes “caused” by drunk driving. The problem as I see it, however, is that the vast majority of car crashes ARE NOT CAUSED by drunk driving. While many believe that the majority of crashes are caused by alcohol or drug impaired driving this is not the case. Like everything else, “sensationalizing” or constant headlines reporting leads many to the conclusion that all crashes are alcohol related. Consider the 2008 statistics compiled by National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA):
In 2008, the NHTSA discovered that 60 percent of fatal crashes were single-vehicle crashes, and from that statistic, 71 percent of those crashes were run-off-road crashes. A run-off-road crash is where the vehicle runs off the road and crashes into an object. What I found that was interesting was that 95 percent of these accidents were due to driver errors. Overcompensating the steering wheel when turning, poor directional control, and driving too fast for the conditions; these are the factors that make up that 95 percent. What this means in simple terms is Americans are horrible drivers. The main reason why people get into car accidents is because they can’t drive.
From this information, reading statutes carefully and with a critical and thoughtful analyses of the language of a statute is important to separate the reality from the rhetoric. This is not intended to mean that drunk driving should be supported, rather it is intended to cause the reader, the citizen, the legislator to read statutes and proposed statues critically, and to think critically.
Why should time and energy be invested into reducing the cause of crashes that is way down the list of reasons for the crashes? The answer is likely because it is easy increase fines and fees for issues associated with DUI than it is to say what the change is really about. It is easy to raise fees and fines for a crime such as DUI because it is popular to hate it. In the words of a good friend of mine, Ted Vosk:
Defending an individual charged with driving under the influence of alcohol can be a challenging affair. Only those accused of sex offenses seem to be viewed with more disgust. The hysteria created by special interest groups has led to the adoption of ill conceived and unfair laws. Moreover, the spasmodic response to the proclaimed “carnage on the highways” has created a DUI exception to the Constitution so that citizen’s are now expected to check their rights at the ignition.
This does not mean we as Defense attorneys are “pro” DUI, rather we are “pro” common sense, fairness, and well thought out and well drafted laws. When we return for a look at the language of this new statute: “utilize innovative approaches based on best practices or proven strategies supported by research or rigorous evaluation” it makes no sense. How do we utilize innovative, meaning new, approaches that are proven? By definition, if they are new they are in fact, unproven. If they are new, how can they be considered a proven strategy? What the statute seeks to implement is methods that are proven to reduce DUI. Really, the only way to reduce it is zero tolerance. The current state of the law is this: it is not illegal to drink and then drive; so people do it.
The problem with permitting a judgment impairing activity is the line between impaired and not impaired is easily crossed. If the legislature wants a new yet proven method of reducing DUI crashes then stop the rhetoric and simply make laws that prohibit any alcohol mixed with driving a crime. Interestingly enough this is one way an innovative yet proven method work. Until such a time that the nation goes to zero tolerance the rhetoric of these statutes and agencies like MADD that seek to reduce DUI, simply seek to increase fundraising for their own causes.
Jonathan Rands is an experienced, dedicated, and tenacious DUI lawyer with proven DUI defense success. The right to a defense, is an important right that effects each and every DUI arrest and charge. If you, or someone you know is facing a DUI, or any alcohol related arrest and charge, contact Jonathan Rands | http://www.jrandslaw.com | Email: jrands@jonathanrands.com | Phn. 360.306.8136 | Jonathan Rands is Focused On Your DUI Defense. | Serving Whatcom, Skagit, Island, and San Juan Counties. | Jonathan Rands regularly discusses DUI issues with (AM 790 ) KGMI every other Sunday on the Legal Docket.
United States Supreme Court Case Requires The Right To Confront Witnesses Even In DUI Cases.
Last month the United States Supreme Court (USSC) took another anticipated step in preserving one of the most fundamental and important rights that an accused person is afforded under the Constitution of The United States. The recent case issued by the USSC of Bullcoming v. New Mexico followed in the path of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36, 59, and Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U. S. ___, in clearly defining the right of confrontation, and in so doing, also defining the obligation of the prosecuting authority in every criminal case. Unlike many cases that are decided by the USSC, Bullcoming was a case of DUI.
The facts of the case are somewhat unimportant, as the “meat” of the case was the fact that the lab analyst who conducted the blood alcohol test that Mr. Bullcoming submitted to was unavailable for trial. In place of the original analysts, a different analyst testified from the report that the first analyst created as the blood was tested. While the substitute analyst had knowledge about what should have been done, or what was usually done, he had no knowledge of what was actually done.
In blood test cases, there are scientific and state policy and protocols that must be followed in order for the results to be admitted and shown to a jury. The inability to determine what was actually done precluded Mr. Bullcoming from confronting the witness. As described by the USSC:
The analysts who write reports introduced as evidence must be made available for confrontation even if they have “the scientific acumen of Mme. Curie and the veracity of Mother Teresa.” [The substitute analyst was not an] adequate substitute witness simply because he qualified as an expert with respect to the testing machine and the laboratory procedures. Surrogate testimony of the kind [the substitute analyst] was equipped to give could not convey what the actual analyst knew or observed about the events he certified, nor expose any lapses or lies on his part. With the actual analyst on the witness stand, Mr. Bullcoming’s counsel could have asked questions designed to reveal whether incompetence, evasiveness, or dishonesty accounted for his removal from work [and thus his unavailability for trial]. The State did not assert that the substitute analyst had any independent opinion concerning Mr. Bullcoming’s blood alcohol content. More fundamentally, the Confrontation Clause does not tolerate dispensing with confrontation simply because the court believes that questioning one witness about another persons testimonial statements provides a fair enough opportunity for cross-examination. Although the purpose of Sixth Amendment rights is to ensure a fair trial, it does not follow that such rights can be disregarded because, on the whole, the trial is fair.
The case is now the highest authority in the land on the issue of confrontation and serves as the new “floor” when it comes to the right to Confront witnesses and what this actually and practically means. Typically, in Washington State a Federal Constitutional right is given even a higher level of protection under the more protective State Constitution. While the Washington State Supreme Court has built upon the prior USSC cases involving and preceding this new case of Confrontation, Bullcoming has now, and once again raised the protective bar accordingly.
Bullcoming permits no substitutes when it comes to confronting ALL witnesses against an accused and this is important in every criminal case, but especially so for DUI cases involving blood tests as well as breath test cases. The importance of the case in a blood case is fairly straight forward: the testing person must be present for the trial unless they were previously confronted at a pre-trial hearing.
With respect to the breath testing the right to confront under Bullcoming is equally operational but it will likely require an Appellant Court to settle the matter despite the fact that the implications are clear to the defense bar. In a DUI prosecution with a breath test, there must be a showing that a breath test machine’s external simulator solution is prepared by a toxicologist. In order to make sure that the solution is certified under lab protocols several other toxicologist must also test the solution. The State and City DUI prosecutors typically call just one of those who had a hand in only the testing phase and not the actual person who created it. They argue against Bullcoming by stating that the multiple testing of the solution and the presence at trial of one of these testers who the defense can, in fact, confront is good enough and distinguishable from Bullcoming.
This is because it is a rare case that the person who ACTUALLY created the solution is present at trial. From the defendant’s Confrontation standpoint, Bullcoming holds that the creator of the solution is required to be there in order to test that person’s veracity, demeanor, and to some extent competence in their creation of the solution. While the solution is easy to prepare, it can be prepared in a manner that is NOT consistent with the required lab protocols and the subsequent testers have no personal knowledge as to how it was actually created. In addition to this, the secondary tests of other analysts would not indicate whether there was any deviation in the preparation. As a result the actual person who prepared the solution needs to be confronted by the accused.
While Bullcoming is apparent and clear to a defense attorney like myself, the lower Court’s typically do not like to stray beyond the rule of law that is clearly on point and therefore convincing the lower bench of this requirement when it happens will be challenging. In fact,that is my personal experience recently. As a result, the objection to the lack of Confrontation and the argument will need to made over and over until someone appeals a final verdict against a defendant and then the Appellant Courts will weight in on the matter.
This was the case in Redmond v. Moore. While that was not a case in response to a Court of higher authority, the attorney’s made the argument over and over and over and were denied repeatedly, until the denial of the motion and argument was appealed Only on appeal was the argument agreed to and then endorsed by the higher Apppellant court. In response to that court ruling the lower courts now had clear authority to enforce the issue and argument and the Department of Licensing was ordered to change their ways had to revamp the method in which it proposed to suspend a person’s driving privilege.
This comment and analogy is not an indictment of the lower courts. In fact their reluctance to step out on a limb and make new law is understood as nobody likes to be actually stray from the established status quo and risk reversal. However, that is the job, as it is the job of defense attorneys to make the argument, to expose the logical legal flaws, to point out the fact that another similar case came to a opposite conclusion, and to present an age old scenario in a different light. Progress in the law is made the same way progress is made in society and technology: a new idea on an old issue.
A defense attorney’s role is typically criticized for creating “loopholes,” or generating the flaws in the law when the reality is we are charged with the duty of protecting clients rights, and if the right to Confront is watered down it is up to us to point it out and argue against it tirelessly until someone recognizes that doing things the same old way, because it has always been this way, is no excuse. As stated by the Court in Bullcoming when quoting another case: “it does not follow that such rights can be disregarded because, on the whole, the trial is fair.” The right itself needs to be respected, otherwise what worth is it?
Jonathan Rands is an experienced, dedicated, and tenacious DUI lawyer with proven DUI defense success. The right to Confront all witnesses is an important right that effects each and every DUI case where there is a breath or blood test measuring alcohol concentration. If you or someone you know is facing a DUI or alcohol related arrest, contact Jonathan Rands | http://www.jrandslaw.com | Email: jrands@jonathanrands.com | Phn. 360.306.8136 | Jonathan Rands is Focused On Your DUI Defense. | Serving Whatcom, Skagit, Island, and San Juan Counties. | Jonathan Rands regularly discusses DUI issues with (AM 790 ) KGMI every other Sunday on the Legal Docket.
